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Given China’s impending membership of the WTO, this paper makes a first attempt to 
predict China’s negotiating strategy in the current agricultural trade negotiations in the light of 
its food policy objectives, trade position and its accession offer on agriculture. China’s 
interests with respect to market access are seen as closer to the EU position in the 
negotiations, while its interests regarding export subsidies, domestic supports and SPS issues 
are closer to the US position. Its specific negotiating objectives are unlikely to seriously 
threaten either US or EU interests, and China will be in a strong position to influence the final 
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1  Introduction 
 
China’s ‘long march to Geneva’2 was successfully concluded at the WTO’s Working 
Party on China’s Accession in July 20013, fifteen years after China formally applied to rejoin 
the GATT in 1986.4 It is hoped that the terms of China’s accession will be formally approved 
by WTO trade ministers in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. China must then ratify the terms 
of its accession, probably in the early part of 2002, after which it will become a full WTO 
member.  
China’s accession to the WTO will have far-reaching significance both for China itself 
and for the rest of the world. One writer, with understandable enthusiasm, has argued that 
“…the final accession of China into the WTO will be remembered as one of the most 
important events of this century” (Wen, 2000). The framework of rules and obligations which 
China will take on as a WTO member will dramatically accelerate the changes in domestic 
policies and laws which were initiated with the open-door policy in 1979. No less important 
will be the impact of China’s participation in shaping the rules of world trade, not least in the 
Millennium Round of trade negotiations which it is hoped WTO trade ministers will also 
launch in Qatar.  
                                           
2  The expression comes from the title of Leonard’s (1999) book on the process which led to China’s admission 
to the WTO. 
3  Almost all of the negotiations were completed at this Seventeenth Meeting of the Working Party. The Working 
Party plans to meet for the last time in September to approve the accession documents. See Frances Williams, 
‘China close to finalising WTO entry negotiations’, Financial Times 20 July 2001. 
4  China was one of the 23 founding members of the GATT in 1948, but withdrew in 1950 after the formation of 
the People’s Republic.    3
Whether or not a comprehensive round of trade negotiations is launched in November, 
China will be entitled to participate in the ongoing negotiations on the WTO’s so-called 
‘built-in agenda’, the various mandates to continue negotiations in specific areas which were 
included in t he Uruguay Round (UR) Agreements. These include a new round of WTO 
negotiations on agricultural trade which began in March 2000 as a direct outcome of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. These negotiations have had an active start. By 
the March 2001 stock-taking meeting, 125 countries (counting the EU5 as 15) out of a total of 
141 WTO Members had submitted a total of 44 sets of proposals and 3 technical submissions. 
The negotiators have agreed a further series of meetings to examine these proposals in greater 
detail, and a further review of progress will be held in March 2002 before entering into the 
bargaining which will be necessary to reach a consensus agreement. No target date has, as yet, 
been set for the conclusion of these negotiations and this will, in turn, depend on whether the 
agricultural negotiations become part of a more comprehensive round. In either case, China is 
likely to be a participant in the final stages of these negotiations and to influence the shape of 
the final outcome. 
China is a major player in world food markets. Most of the literature on the 
agricultural aspects of China’s WTO accession to date has focused on its implications for 
world prices and trade volumes (Colby et al, 2000; Fuller et al, 2001; Schmidhuber, 2001). 
But China’s accession will also have great importance for the agricultural negotiations 
because of its influence on the negotiating dynamic and the alliances formed between the 
principal participants in the negotiations: the EU, the US, the Cairns Group, Japan and the 
developing countries.6 The key question is whether China will tend to side with the 
                                           
5  In the WTO, it is formally the European Communities (EC) which negotiates on behalf of the 15 member 
states. We refer to the EU throughout this paper as it is now the commonly accepted usage. 
6  See Gilmour and Brink, 2001 for another view of this issue.   4
‘liberalisers’ - those countries seeking a rapid reduction in remaining agricultural protection 
and support – or with the ‘friends of multifunctionality’ who seek to retain the possibility of 
coupled production support for specific food, environmental or rural development objectives. 
The negotiations are, of course, more nuanced than this simple dichotomy suggests and not all 
countries can be pigeon-holed into these two groups. China will have particular negotiating 
objectives to pursue and will seek to build alliances that maximise its probability of success in 
achieving these objectives. This paper makes a first attempt to predict China’s negotiating 
strategy in the light of its food policy objectives, trade position and its accession offer on 
agriculture. 
The key hypothesis put forward is that China’s interests are more orthogonal to, rather 
than either complementary to or conflicting with, those of the two main participants in the 
agricultural negotiations, the US and the EU. China’s history of extensive government 
intervention in agricultural markets would seem to make it a natural ally of the EU in resisting 
full-scale agricultural liberalisation. However, China will have little immediate interest in 
making direct payments to farmers whether under ‘blue box’ constraints or to pursue 
multifunctional objectives, and will have already agreed to refrain from the use of export 
subsidies, both of which are key EU interests. On the other hand, China is unlikely to share 
the US interest in immediate and widespread liberalisation, despite its low average 
agricultural tariffs after WTO accession; its grain security apprehensions are too sensitive for 
that. China’s objectives will be quite specific to its own concerns: lower tariffs on its fruit, 
vegetable, aquatic and processed food exports; safeguards against unduly low world prices; 
the maintenance of its tariff rate quotas and state trading of grains; and recognition of its 
status as a developing country in the application of domestic supports. None of these demands 
would directly threaten either US or EU interests, although it is possible that the EU would 
find it easier to accommodate them. China thus will be in a strong position to influence the   5
final outcome of the negotiations by offering its support to whichever country most facilitates 
its pursuit of its specific objectives. 
Section 2 of the paper sets the context by examining China’s recent food policy 
objectives and agricultural trade situation and policy. Section 3 describes what is known about 
China’s WTO offer in agriculture at this point in time and summarises the results of recent 
studies of the impact of China’s WTO accession on its agricultural production and trade. 
Section 4 speculates on China’s likely attitude to some of the key negotiating issues in the 
current agricultural round. In this section, the US and EU negotiating proposals are used to 
define the negotiating ‘space’ within which China can manoeuvre. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
   
2  China’s food policy and trade 
 
The extraordinary growth in China’s GDP in the post-reform period after 1979 has 
been accompanied by rapid change in the structure of its economy (Table 1). Agriculture 
contributed 40% of Chinese GDP in 1970, but its share fell to only 18% in 1999. However, 
agriculture’s employment share, which amounted to 81% in 1970, remains very high at 50% 
in 1999. China is still overwhelmingly rural, with 69% of its population living in rural areas 
even in 1999. 
Grain self-sufficiency has been central to Chinese agricultural policy and agricultural 
policy reform has closely reflected developments on its grain market. Over the reform period, 
China has moved from a position where it significantly taxed agricultural producers to one 
where producer prices are close to world market levels or, in the case of grain, even above 
world market levels in recent years. The downturn in grain production and the jump in grain 
prices in the mid-1990s was a severe shock to the Chinese authorities and reinforced their   6
commitment to maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency in grain. Since the mid-1990s, a 
series of measures has been introduced, including price support, in pursuit of this objective. 
Indeed, recent policies even emphasise grain self-sufficiency at the provincial level through 
the provincial governors’ grain responsibility system.7 As a result, China has experienced 
bumper harvests (apart from a drought in 2000) and grain imports in recent years have almost 
vanished. 
 
Table 1. Changes in the structure of China’s economy, 1970-99, per cent 
  1970  1980  1985  1990  1995  1999 
Share in GDP             
  Agriculture  40  30  28  27  20  18 
  Industry  46  49  43  42  49  49 
  Services  13  21  29  31  31  33 
Share in employment             
  Agriculture  81  69  62  60  52  50 
  Industry  10  18  21  21  23  23 
  Services  9  13  17  19  25  27 
Share in agricultural 
output 
           
  Crop  82  76  69  65  58  58 
  Forestry  2  4  5  4  3  4 
  Livestock  14  18  22  26  30  29 
  Fishery  2  2  3  5  8  10 
Share of rural 
population  
83  81  76  72  71  69 
Source: Huang, 2000 based on State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; and China 
Rural Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
China is now a significant food exporter, with exports of $11.0 billion in 1999 
compared to imports of $6.9 billion. China accounts for one-sixth of the world’s food market 
                                           
7  This policy introduced in late 1994 gives provincial governors the responsibility to maintain the ‘grain bag’. 
Governors are to stabilise the area sown to grain crops, guarantee investment in agricultural inputs to   7
despite its still relatively low per capita income. More detail on the structure of exports and 
imports is shown in Table 2. In eight out of the eleven product categories China was a net 
exporter in 1999. Particularly impressive is the growth in exports of the fruit and vegetables 
and fish categories, both of which now account for $3 billion of exports annually. On the 
import side, China’s principal imports are oilseeds and vegetable oils. The ‘governors’ grain 
responsibility system’ does not cover oilseeds or their products which enjoy a relatively 
liberal policy regime (OECD, 2000a). Over the last few years, this has combined with freer 
trade to promote rapidly rising imports of oilseeds, oilmeals, and vegetable oils, especially 
soybeans, soya products, rapeseed and palm oil. Meat and dairy product imports are 
conspicuously low.  
 
Table 2. Structure of China’s agricultural trade, 1980-1999, US$ million 
Commodity  SITC  1980  1985  1990  1995  1999 
    Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Import  Export  Import 
Live 
animals 
00  384  5  304  18  430  14  473  18  374  22 




02  71  5  57  31  55  81  61  60  71  160 
Fish etc.  03  380  13  283  44  1370  102  2,875  609  2,969  890 
Cereals etc.  04  423  2458  1065  982  614  2353  281  3,631  1,273  574 
Vegetables 
and fruits 
05  746  48  825  52  1759  83  3,399  185  3,150  384 
Sugar etc.  06  221  316  79  274  317  390  321  935  214  183 
Coffee, tea 
etc. 




08  58  14  241  83  623  182  351  423  239  620 
Others  09  49  2  66  23  107  46  290  92  541  182 
Hides and 
skins 
21  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  51  411  13  408 
Oilseeds  22  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  522  110  373  1,531 
Vegetable 
oils 
4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  454  2,596  132  1,352 
Total food    3,021  2,918  3,803  1,553  6,600  3,335  10,951  9,239  10,964  6,882 
                                                                                                                                    
stimulate grain production, and stabilise grain prices. Additional production is stimulated by subsidised 
inputs (notably fertiliser, pesticides and water) and by administrative pressures.   8
Source: Feng (1999) for the 1980, 1985 and 1990 data; OECD International Trade Statistics database for the 
1995 and 1999 data. Feng also provides the 1995 data which are similar to those reported here. He does not give 
data for trade outside the SITC 0 category. 
 
China’s net food exporter status reflects, in part, the restricted market access it allows 
to imported agricultural products. High tariffs, quantitative barriers, sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures and regulation of market access are the major obstacles. China’s average 
tariff rate for agriculture is around 22 per cent8, but many products are protected by much 
higher rates. Figure 1 shows the applied MFN rates for bulk agricultural commodities levied 
in 1998. Imports of grains and oilseeds, however, can enter under a tariff rate quota system at 
a reduced rate of duty. China introduced tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for wheat, maize and rice in 
1996, although no rules covering their administration or actual quota volumes have been 
revealed publicly (Schmidhuber, 2001). In-quota tariff rates in 1998 varied from 8.7 per cent 
on average for wheat, 3.1 per cent for rice and 10.8 per cent for maize. In 1996, China also 
announced it was introducing TRQs for oilseeds but it failed to implement these and relied 
instead on readily available import licences to regulate trade flows. Soybean imports are 
subject to a 3 per cent in-quota tariff while soybean meal imports incur a 5 per cent in-quota 
tariff. Soybean oil, in contrast, is subject to a quota system and a 13 per cent tariff.  
China limits the types and numbers of enterprises that have the legal right to engage in 
international trade. Only firms granted trading rights may import products into China and 
have access to China’s distribution system. In addition, some products such as grains, cotton 
and vegetable oils can be imported only or principally through state-trading enterprises 
(STEs). The most important of these is COFCO (China Cereals, Oils and Foodstuff Import 
                                           
8    The 22 per cent figure is the US estimate contained in the White House Fact Sheet on the US-China WTO 
Accession Deal and US Agriculture, 10 February 2000.   9
and Export Company). The consequence of this closely-regulated trading system is that 
reducing tariffs is unlikely to be effective without liberalising trading rights and reducing the 
role of STEs in China. 
Direct export subsidies and VAT rebates for exporters formed the main elements of 
China’s past export promotion policies. Direct subsidies were abolished on 1 January 1991 
and in 1997 China assured a WTO working party it would not resurrect them (OECD, 2000a). 
However, it has been reported that China subsidised its maize exports in 1999 and 2000 as a 
way of reducing excessive stocks (Schmidhuber, 2001). Cereal exports can also benefit from 
indirect export subsidies. COFCO can buy low-price ‘quota grain’ from the domestic 
procurement system and sell it on world markets at prices below the domestic price. The 
subsidy element is financed by grain producers who must deliver a percentage of their 
production quota at lower procurement prices. The VAT rebate system also functions as an 
indirect export subsidy. While the reimbursement of VAT paid on inputs is a normal 
commercial practice and does not in itself constitute a subsidy, China is alleged to use varying 
and discretionary VAT reliefs and exemptions as a way of managing both imports and exports 
(Schmidhuber, 2001). 
 
3  China’s WTO accession offer in agriculture 
 
The full details of China’s agricultural offer are not yet known, as the Schedule of 
Commitments will be based on the best offers made in the bilateral negotiations which have 
taken place with the 37 WTO members which requested them. However, enough is known of 
the outcome of the bilateral negotiations with the US and the EU, in particular, to be able to 
construct the shape of the final accession offer. The agricultural market access concessions 
include tariff reductions, the establishment of tariff rate quotas for bulk commodities,   10
commitments not to use export subsidies and to reduce domestic support, and a phase-out of 
restrictions on trading rights.  
Tariffs on agricultural products will be cut from an overall average of 22% to 14%. 
Tariff cuts for selected products drawn largely from the US bilateral agreement are shown in 
Table 3. Further tariff reductions agreed in the EU-China bilateral negotiations include rape 
oil (down from 85% to 9%), pasta (down from 25% to 15%), butter (down from 30% to 10%), 
mandarins (down from 40% to 12%), olives (down from 25% to 10%) and wheat gluten 
(down from 30% to 18%). Tariffs on all spirits are reduced from 65% to 10%. 
In addition, China plans to use a TRQ system to expand market opportunities for a 
number of bulk commodities including wheat, maize, rice, soybean oil, cotton, wool, sugar, 
palm oil and rapeseed oil. All of these commodities, except for wool, are currently subject to 
state trading. The quantities of these commodities allowed in at the low ‘within-quota’ tariff 
rate (1-3%) will increase annually from 2000 through 2004 (except for soybean oil which will 
be fully liberalised with nothing but a bound duty by 2006). Overall, the total TRQ for grains 
will amount to 22.1 mmt. In addition, there will be some imports of barley outside the TRQ 
system which will be offset by continued exports of low-quality rice. Given that grain 
consumption in China in 2005 is projected to be around 420 million tonnes, these limits will 
allow China to maintain its 95 per cent grain self-sufficiency objective after accession, even 
assuming that the TRQs are binding.9  
As noted above, only companies that receive specific authorisation from the Chinese 
government are currently allowed to import into China. Under the US Agreement, China has 
committed to allow any entity to import most products into any part of the country within 
three years of accession. At the end of this transition period, all foreign and domestic 
                                           
9  Some projection studies find that the TRQs will not be binding at least until 2010 (Fuller et al, 2001).   11
enterprises will have trading rights. A select list of products will be partially exempt from this 
rule. Some trade will be channelled through China’s state-trading enterprises (including 
wheat, corn, rice and cotton; however, state trading will be phased out for soybean oil). 
However, in the case of the TRQs for these products, a growing share of the rising TRQ 
imports is reserved for non-state trading entities to encourage private sector participation in 
China’s trade activities. China has also committed to liberalise distribution services for all 
agricultural products, except tobacco, allowing foreign companies to distribute and market 
their products in China. 
 
Table 3. Selected tariff bindings offered by China 
Commodity  Current tariff levels  Likely out of quota final bindings 
  %  % 
Barley  91  9 
Beef  45  12 
Pork  20  12 
Poultry  20  10 
Soybeans  114  3 
Wheat, maize, rice  114  65 
Milk powder  25  10 
Wine  65  14 
Citrus  40  12 
Cheese  50  12 
Sources: Martin 1999, Hanrahan 2000, EU press release10, OECD 2000a. 
 
China has further agreed not to use export subsidies after accession. It has also agreed 
to cap domestic subsidies and to make them more transparent and predictable. The specific 
level of the cap was one of the most contentious issues in the Working Party negotiations on 
accession. China insisted that it should be allowed developing country status and held out for 
the 10% de minimis exemption and more favourable treatment of certain domestic support   12
policies which would follow from its acceptance as a developing country.  Developed 
countries, and the US in particular, were willing to grant China no more than the 5% ceiling 
allowed to developed countries. Recent reports suggest that a compromise 7-8% limit was 
acceptable to all sides (Financial Times 23 May 2001). 
In return for these concessions, China will gain access to the markets of existing WTO 
members on MFN terms. The likely impact of WTO accession on the future outlook for 
China’s food economy is hotly debated, not least because rapid economic growth is radically 
changing the economic environment for China’s food production and demand and makes 
projections particularly uncertain. The conventional wisdom is that  grain markets will 
experience a sustained demand increase driven by growth of population (expected to reach 1.6 
billion in 2020), rapid urbanisation, rising income levels and the expansion of the livestock 
sector (as a consequence of growing meat consumption). These factors are unlikely to be 
matched by compensating shifts in the supply of grains due to (i) the transition of land, labour 
and capital to non-agricultural uses, (ii) a slowdown in yield growth, and (iii) environmental 
degradation (erosion, salinisation). However, the recent forecasts published by three of the 
main agencies which undertake medium-range agricultural projections – the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA, 2001), the OECD (OECD, 2000a) and the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Institute (FAPRI, 2001) - indicate relatively limited import growth in the next decade. 
For example, the USDA in 2001 projected grain imports in 2010/11 of 10.7 million tonnes, 
while the FAPRI figure is 13.7 million tonnes.   
These projections are based on the technical assumption of unchanged policies and do 
not incorporate the likely impact of China’s accession to the WTO. A review of recent studies 
which have addressed this question using both partial and general equilibrium methodologies 
                                                                                                                                    
10  Highlights of the EU-China agreement can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/china/high.htm.   13
leads to the conclusion that, while WTO accession will lead to some increase in China’s net 
agricultural imports, it is unlikely to have a dramatic effect on its grain self-sufficiency ratio.11 
There seems no reason to expect a dramatic deterioration in China’s grain self-sufficiency 
ratio either as a result of economic structural change, or as a result of WTO accession, in the 
medium term.  China has a number of alternative ways to promote grain self-sufficiency apart 
from price support, including investment in research and infrastructure, liberalisation of its 
internal grain market and greater security of land tenure for farmers. All of these policies will 
continue to be available to the Chinese authorities after WTO membership. Another 
implication of the modest projected increase in China’s net food imports after accession is 
that the effect on world market prices will not be dramatic. Fuller et al. (2001), for example, 
forecast that maize, wheat and soybean prices will rise by less than 3.5 per cent, and the 
biggest effect will be felt in world cotton markets where international prices increase 11.2 per 
cent by 2010. To the extent that more buoyant world markets make it easier for countries to 
agree to reduce agricultural protectionism, there is little evidence that China’s accession will 
contribute to increased liberalisation through this channel.   
 
4  China’s interests in the current round of WTO agricultural negotiations 
 
                                           
11  Recent studies applying a partial equilibrium methodology include Iowa State University’s FAPRI model 
(Fuller et al, 2001), the OECD’s AgLink model (Schmidhuber, 2001), the CAPSIM model maintained by the 
Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Huang, Rozelle 
and Rosegrant, 1999; Huang, Chen, Rozelle and Tuan, 1999; Huang, 2000) and the Country Linked System 
of models developed at USDA’s Economic Research Service (Colby et al. 2000). General equilibrium studies 
include Wang 1997, Anderson et al. 1997, Huang and Yang 2000, Li and Zhai 2000 and Felloni et al. 2000. 
In comparing study results, a key difference is what each study assumes about China’s WTO offer and how 
this is modelled. See also the articles by Huang, Rozelle and Zhang (2000) and Lin (2000).   14
This section assesses the position which China might take on the various issues which 
have been raised to date in the current round of agricultural trade negotiations. China is not 
yet a participant in these negotiations. The views attributed to it in this section are speculative 
but informed by the analysis of China’s agricultural policy objectives and trade regime 
presented earlier. It is clearly of interest to the main participants to try to define where China’s 
negotiating interests will lie in order to assess the possibility of building alliances around 
specific issues. In particular, we focus in this section on the impact of China’s membership on 
the US/EU dialogue by identifying those areas where China’s interests are likely to coincide 
with those of the EU and the US, and where those interests are likely to differ. 12 
 
4.1  Market access negotiations 
The market access negotiations revolve around (a) the depth of future tariff reductions 
(b) the pattern of future tariff reductions, (c) safeguards against unusually low world market 
prices (d) the extent of any increase in the tariff rate quotas, and (e) the administration of tariff 
rate quotas. 
 
                                           
12  The US tabled its initial position paper on agriculture on 23 June 2000 entitled ‘Proposal for Long-term 
Agricultural Trade Reform (WTO:G/AG/NG/W/15). This contained proposals for reform in each of the key 
areas of market access, export competition and domestic support. It submitted further notes elaborating on its 
proposal for domestic support reform (G/AG/NG/W/16) and on reform of TRQs (G/AG/NG/W/58). The EU 
has submitted four papers on specific issues it wished to raise in the negotiations (Blue box support 
G/AG/NG/W/17; the protection of regional food names G/AG/NG/W/18; animal welfare G/AG/NG/W/19; 
and export competition G/AG/NG/W/34). It also joined with a number of other countries in submitting a 
proposal on non-trade concerns (G/AG/NG/W/36). It subsequently submitted its comprehensive proposal on 
16 December 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/90).    15
4.1.1  Amount and structure of tariff reductions 
The twin objectives of the US proposal on tariffs are to (i) substantially reduce or 
eliminate all tariffs by annual reductions over a fixed period, and (ii) substantially reduce or 
eliminate disparities in tariff levels both across countries and across products (tariff 
escalation). One consequence is that higher tariffs (those on more sensitive commodities) 
would be reduced by more than lower tariffs. It also proposes the elimination of the Special 
Safeguard Arrangement, agreed under the URAA, whereby importing countries may 
temporarily raise duties in response to sudden import surges for those commodities which 
underwent tariffication, provided this right was scheduled in a country’s WTO commitments. 
The EU takes the opposite approach in proposing that the formula for tariff reductions 
should be a commitment as to the overall reduction of bound tariffs and a minimum reduction 
per tariff line, as was the case in the Uruguay Round. Its arguments for the continuation of the 
Uruguay Round approach include that it allows for sufficient flexibility in lowering tariffs to 
allow members to take into account the particular situation of specific sectors. Decoding this, 
the effect would be to allow countries to reduce tariffs on sensitive sectors by less than the 
overall average agreed, thus having the opposite effect to the US proposal. To date, no figures 
have been proposed as to what this overall average might be. 
Multilateral tariff reductions have two consequences. They increase market access 
abroad for a country’s exporters, while opening up the domestic market to increased 
competition. It is thus not surprising to find net exporting countries pushing more 
enthusiastically for significant tariff reductions than net importing countries. The US, EU and 
China are all currently net agricultural exporters, although their comparative advantage differs 
across commodities. In China’s case, it has export interests in vegetables, horticultural crops, 
fish products and possibly intensive animal products (pigmeat and poultrymeat). Martin 
(1999) used the GTAP 4 database to examine the duty burden on China’s agricultural exports   16
and estimated that the average tariff rate faced by China on its agricultural product exports 
was, at 32 per cent, four times higher than the average tariff faced on its exports of other 
products. This suggests there are definite export market gains worth going after for China in 
the current round of negotiations. 
The costs of opening the domestic market to greater import competition must be set 
against these export gains.13 This cost, in turn, will be a function of the existing level of 
import protection. China’s average tariff of around 14% post WTO entry will put it in the 
lowest quartile of countries with respect to agricultural protection rates (for data on mean 
agricultural protection rates by country, see Gibson et al, 2001). In general, China’s tariff 
structure appears much lower than the EU (where the average is 30 per cent) but is on a par 
with that of the US (whose average is 12 per cent, both figures from Gibson op. cit.). The 
implications of low tariff bindings for China’s future stance in tariff negotiations are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the fact that tariffs are low and thus provide little protection 
could mean that the Chinese authorities will not object to further cuts in these tariffs.14 The 
other possibility is that, precisely because protection is so limited at present, the Chinese 
authorities will be reluctant to see it further reduced. The experience of other liberal 
economies with low rates of agricultural protection (for example, members of the Cairns 
Group) suggests that, on balance, the Chinese may feel they have more to gain from further 
                                           
13  The term ‘cost’ here is used to denote the political cost to a government from import-competing interests. 
Under standard economic assumptions, trade liberalisation gives rise to economic benefits, not costs. Political 
costs can arise because the way in which economic gains and losses are distributed can be perceived 
differently by different groups in the population. 
14  Another motive for tariffs, particularly in developing countries, is as a source of government revenue. 
However, China has a very small dependence on agricultural tariffs for government revenue and the loss of 
this tariff revenue would be easily made up through other sources.   17
reductions. However, while this may be their general stance, it will not necessarily apply 
across each commodity. Their attitude to lower tariff levels for individual commodities will 
depend on the trade balance and the existing level of protection for those commodities. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of tariff rates on agricultural products for US, EU and China 
  US  EU  China post-WTO 
entry (projected) 
Grains  2  53  65 
Oilseeds  17  0  3 
Oilcake  2  3  5 
Vegetable oils  4  13  9 
Meat: fresh beef, 
pork or poultry 
12  41  25 
Meat: frozen beef, 
pork or poultry 
9  66  12 
Dairy  43  87  10-12 
Fruit: fresh  4  21  12 
Vegetables: fresh  7  16  n.a. 
Sugar beet  0  349  n.a. 
Sugar cane  1  56  n.a. 
Sweeteners  46  59  n.a. 
Source: Gibson et al., 2001 for US and EU average tariff rates; China data from Section 3 of this paper. 
Note: US and EU tariffs are bound final tariffs after URAA implementation. They are unweighted averages of 
the ad valorem tariff equivalents levied on all tariff headings within that commodity grouping. Because many of 
the tariffs levied by the US and the EU are specific or mixed tariffs (in both countries 44 per cent of all tariffs are 
specified in non-ad valorem terms), calculating a tariff average requires making use of average import unit 
values in order to compute the ad valorem tariff equivalents. The Chinese tariffs are not directly comparable as 
they refer to representative commodities within the tariff group rather than being unweighted tariff averages. The 
effect of averaging would be to reduce the figures shown in the Chinese column. For example, in the grains 
category, the tariff on wheat gluten will be 18%, on pasta 15% while the tariff on barley will be 9%. Once these 
lower rates are averaged in, the mean tariff on grains will be much less than the 65% shown in the table which 
applies to bulk wheat, maize and rice only. 
 
A comparison of the tariff structures of the US, EU and China is shown in Table 4. 
The three countries have quite dispersed tariff structures (meaning that the tariff rates levied   18
on individual commodities are quite variable), but the sensitive commodities in each country’s 
tariff schedule are different. China will have a pattern typical of many developing countries 
where the highest tariff protection is maintained on grains for largely food security reasons. 
Support to animal production is much more limited.  Indeed, if domestic grain prices exceed 
world market prices due to protection, this could result in negative effective protection to 
China’s intensive animal producers, although this will be mitigated by the essentially tariff-
free import of protein feed sources. In the case of the US and the EU, on the other hand, the 
highest protection is provided to animal producers (particularly dairy and beef farmers) and to 
sugar beet growers. If account is taken of the fact that grains and oilseeds trade at close to 
world market levels, then the effective protection provided to US and EU dairy and beef 
farmers is even higher than the nominal tariff rates suggest. 
These considerations suggest that China’s interests in further tariff reductions will lie 
midway between those of the EU and the US. As an exporter, China will be keen to push for a 
significant further cut in tariffs in the next round. However, it will be conscious of the 
implications of any cut on its out-of-quota tariffs on wheat, maize and rice. There appears to 
be considerable ‘water’ in these tariffs at the present time.15 Although domestic grain prices in 
China between 1997-2000 appear to be somewhat above world prices, over the longer run 
market prices are close to world market prices. As world market prices recover following the 
                                           
15  Producer prices in China are not as much above world market prices as the simple tariff figure might suggest, 
which might be an indication that some of the tariff protection is redundant and could be removed without an 
adverse effect on domestic prices – hence the phrase ‘water in the tariff’. Another explanation for the low 
producer prices compared to the amount of tariff protection might be that grain handlers and processors in 
China are not as efficient as their overseas competitors and may take advantage of their monopoly position to 
depress prices to farmers. In this situation, lowering tariffs would have an adverse effect on domestic 
producer prices unless there was a simultaneous improvement in processing and handling efficiency.   19
Asian downturn, current levels of protection may well disappear. Thus China may be less 
concerned about the impact of substantial tariff cuts that might appear at first sight. On the 
other hand, as these lower tariffs would be bound, they would reduce China’s freedom of 
manoeuvre to increase protection to its grain farmers in the future. But its ability to provide 
increased price support in future will in any case be circumscribed by its domestic support 
commitments (see below). 
China’s concerns would be further eased if the Uruguay Round formula were again 
applied, as this would allow it to limit the cuts in out-of-quota grain tariffs to less than the 
average agreed. China may well calculate that, in the Asian markets of most interest to it, the 
minimum reductions will apply largely to food grains (where it has little comparative 
advantage) rather than to the commodities where it can show export gains. Thus, China may 
not benefit greatly by insisting on a tariff-cutting approach which reduces very high tariffs 
disproportionately in order to achieve the harmonisation of tariffs as the US has proposed. 
 
4.1.2  Tariff rules and price stability 
WTO membership will mean that China’s grain economy will become increasingly 
integrated with the world grain economy. One of the concerns of China’s policy makers is 
that volatility of world market prices will spill over into fluctuations in domestic grain prices 
in a more liberal market. Tariffication in the Uruguay Round was expected to lead to greater 
transmission of world price fluctuations into domestic markets, and thus to reduced variability 
in world prices. In practice, the stabilising effect of tariffication has been undermined by the 
practice of countries varying applied tariffs in response to world market price changes. An 
applied tariff is the actual tariff rate applied by an importing country, and may differ from the 
bound rate. This practice is not prohibited under the rules of the WTO provided the applied 
rate remains at or below the rate bound in a country’s Uruguay Round schedule.   20
China would be likely to support any measures which would reduce its vulnerability to 
imported price instability. Preventing countries from raising applied tariffs (for example, 
when world prices fell) would be counter-productive as it would discourage countries from 
lowering applied rates if, de facto, this was taken as offering a lower bound rate. Another 
alternative would be to permit the use of a safeguard clause, along the lines of the Special 
Safeguard Clause introduced in the Uruguay Round for countries and commodities which 
underwent tariffication.  Ideally, the use of this clause would be limited to developing 
countries and, perhaps, only to foodgrains under a food security opt out for developing 
countries. Depending on how China’s status as a developing country is defined in the 
accession protocol, this could provide some assurance to China that domestic market stability 
would not be undermined by wild swings in world market prices. 
Another source of potential world market price instability is that, although the 
Uruguay Round disciplines the use of export subsidies, its disciplines on the use of export 
taxes are much less strict.  Article XI of GATT 1947 prohibits quantitative export restrictions 
but makes an explicit exception for ‘export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to 
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting 
contracting party’. Article 12 of the UR Agreement on Agriculture tightens this a little by 
calling on Members, with respect to new restrictions on foodstuffs, to give ‘due consideration’ 
to the food security concerns of importing countries and requires adequate notice and 
consultation prior to implementation. Developing countries are exempt from these provisions 
unless they are regular food exporters. Both the US and the Cairns Group have proposed to 
prohibit the use of export taxes, including differential export taxes, for competitive advantage 
or supply management purposes.16 The EU does not mention export taxes in its proposal on 
                                           
16  The Cairns Group proposal is contained in WTO: G/AG/NG/W/93.   21
export competition, although it has used them since the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement 
in order to stabilise its domestic prices.17 China is likely to remain a net grain importer for 
some time, even if the magnitude of grain imports will be smaller than earlier studies in the 
mid-1990s had projected. On these grounds, one could expect that China would favour any 
moves which would enhance the  predictability of trade flows, and would support the 
strengthening of multilateral rules on export controls and taxes.  
A third issue under this heading is that a high proportion of agricultural tariffs take the 
form of specific or mixed tariffs rather than ad valorem tariffs. A specific tariff is levied as a 
fixed absolute amount per quantity of imports; an ad valorem tariff is levied as a percentage 
amount on the value of imports. Mixed tariffs combine elements of both. The US has 
proposed to denominate bindings and applied rates either on a specific or ad valorem basis, 
without the use of complex tariffs or combinations of tariffs. However, it does not go as far as 
to propose to restrict tariffs only to ad valorem tariffs. Specific tariffs implicitly provide a 
measure of variable protection because they bear more heavily when import prices are low 
than when import prices are high. Specific tariffs also have a higher protective effect against 
lower-quality (and hence lower-value) imports than against high-quality imports. As the unit 
value of China’s food and agricultural exports may be lower than for its competitors, the 
implication is that specific tariffs bear disproportionately heavier against its exports. For both 
these reasons, China would have an interest in encouraging more widespread use of  ad 
valorem tariffs in the future. 
 
                                           
17  The March 1999 Berlin reforms maintain the instrument of export taxes within the market management 
measures available under the CAP. However, it was agreed that in future their use would be restricted to a 
safeguard measure in cases of extreme emergency.   22
4.1.3  Tariff rate quotas 
An issue in the current negotiations is the future of tariff rate quotas. These were 
introduced to provide a guaranteed opportunity for market access in the knowledge that, even 
at the end of the Uruguay Round, agricultural tariffs would be bound at very high levels. 
Exporting countries are calling for some increase in tariff rate quotas to improve market 
access opportunities. The US, for example, has proposed that these should be substantially 
increased by annual increments over a fixed period and their functioning improved, including 
dealing with unfilled quotas. A later paper addressed the problem of unfilled TRQs, attributed 
by the US to poor administration and unduly high in-quota duties (WTO: G/AG/NG/W/58). 
The US proposes to base the reduction of in-quota duties on the historical performance of 
TRQ fill rates: the lower the fill rate the deeper the duty cut. An automatic trigger mechanism 
is suggested to reduce in-quota duties in response to falling fill rates. The EU’s negotiating 
proposal is noticeably silent on the issue of increasing TRQs. However, it does propose that 
rules and disciplines should be defined to increase the transparency, the reliability and the 
security of the management of TRQs such that the concessions already granted are fully 
realised. 
China could well ally itself with the EU on this issue. China will introduce tariff rate 
quotas on grain imports which will allow it to pursue its goal of 95 per cent self-sufficiency in 
food grains. Any further increase in these quota amounts would threaten this objective. While 
in a decade’s time, a more industrialised China might feel more confident about relaxing this 
objective and relying to a greater extent on grain imports which would increasingly be 
destined for its animal feed sector, there are few signs that such a policy shift is being 
contemplated at the present time. China will therefore seek to defend its tariff rate quotas at 
close to current levels in the current round. 
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4.1.4  State trading enterprises and TRQs 
In addition to the size of tariff rate quotas, the negotiations will focus on the 
administration of these quotas and the way in which quotas are allocated to exporting 
countries. Various methods are in use including first-come first-served, allocation on the basis 
of historic market shares, auctions, licensing and imports undertaken by State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs).  The United States has expressed concern that the activities of these STEs 
could act as a de facto market barrier and, by limiting imports, could underpin domestic 
prices. It therefore proposes to end exclusive import rights to allow private sector competition 
in markets controlled by single desk importers. The EU in its proposal is concerned about the 
activities of exporting STEs but does not raise the issue of importing STEs. The issue is 
relevant to China because it has granted monopoly import rights to STEs to administer TRQs 
for a limited number of commodities including wheat, maize, rice, cotton and oilseeds.  
In fact, WTO figures suggest that TRQs administered by STEs have a higher fill rate 
than other allocation mechanisms. China has already agreed under the US-China Protocol 
(whose terms at a minimum will be included in the WTO Protocol) that the share of private 
trade in TRQ trade will gradually increase over the period of its accession to the WTO. It has 
further agreed that where unfilled quota remains three-quarters of the way through the year, it 
must be offered to private traders if they can make use of it. Provided its experience of 
operating these rules is a satisfactory one, China may be willing to further reduce the role of 
its monopoly STEs in the current round. In particular, since China has agreed that private 
traders must be permitted to import unused TRQ, then it might support the adoption of such a 
general rule in the GATT (Williams, 2000).  
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4.2  Export competition 
On export competition, the central features of the US proposals are to eliminate 
agricultural export subsidies, by annual reductions over a fixed period, with respect to both 
the value and the volume of exports; to end the exclusive export rights of STEs; and to 
conduct negotiations on Export Credit Programmes within the OECD. The EU’s position is 
that it is ready to negotiate further reductions in export subsidies on condition that all forms of 
export subsidisation are treated on an equal footing. It wants officially supported export 
credits in agriculture to be covered by specific WTO rules and disciplines, strengthened 
provisions to prevent the abuse of food aid and, in respect of the operation of STEs, that 
cross-subsidisation, price-pooling and other unfair trade practices in exports should be 
abolished.  
China will enter the WTO with no entitlement to export subsidies and thus, at first 
sight, would have no interest in allowing other countries to maintain them. Indeed, as an 
exporter of fruits, vegetables, aquatic products and intensive animal products, it may feel that 
it would benefit from eliminating the possibility of the use of export subsidies by its potential 
competitors. However, if it sees that export subsidies are paid on bulk commodities which it 
mainly imports and which turn the terms of trade in its favour, it might be persuaded that 
there are some short-term advantages in allowing other exporters to use export subsidies.  It 
would probably be willing to include export credits within the definition of export subsidies 
for the purposes of the reductions (Williams, 2000).  
China will be affected by any disciplines on exporting STEs to the extent that it will 
want to continue to channel grain exports through COFCO. China’s grain marketing practices 
in the past have allowed COFCO to export grain with an implicit export subsidy, in that it 
could purchase grain at a low procurement price from farmers for sale on export markets. 
Now that grain procurement prices in recent years have been above world market prices, there   25
is little rationale to continue this practice. China will probably not have any major interest in 
opposing strengthened rules and disciplines in this area. 
 
4.3  Domestic support 
Rules on domestic support are a further contentious issue between the US and the EU. 
The US proposals in this area are, first, to restrict domestic support disciplines to only two 
categories, ‘exempt support’ and ‘non-exempt support’. The former of these categories 
corresponds with current ‘green box’ and the latter with ‘amber’ payments. In other words, 
the US proposes to eliminate the present ‘blue box’ category of support, under which most 
EU agricultural support payments now fall. This may be seen as a direct consequence of the 
1996 FAIR Act, under which the US largely abandoned coupled deficiency payment support 
(‘blue box’) in favour of diminishing decoupled production flexibility contract payments 
(‘green box’). Second, it proposes that non-exempt support ‘be reduced to a final bound level 
equal to a fixed percentage of the member’s value of total agricultural production in a fixed 
base period’. Further, it proposes ‘the fixed percentage [to] be the same for all members and 
reductions [to] be made through progressive annual reduction commitments over a fixed 
period.’ Thus the US wants countries starting at widely varying levels of domestic support to 
finish at the same level (at the end of the implementation period). Third, in a reference to the 
multifunctional role of agriculture, the US claims to support policies that ‘address nontrade 
concerns, including food security, resource conservation, rural development and 
environmental protection.’ However, it maintains that ‘these objectives are best met through 
non-distorting means, with programs targeted to the particular concern, without creating new 
economic distortions, thereby avoiding passing the cost of achieving these objectives to other 
countries….’    26
The EU has proposed that the reform process should be pursued by further reduction 
in the Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) by strengthening the rules concerning non-
product-specific domestic support, and by reducing the de minimis clause for developed 
countries. It wants to maintain the concept of the ‘blue’ and ‘green’ boxes, as well as the 
general rules and disciplines applying to them, but is prepared to discuss the detailed rules on 
domestic support. It proposes that the criteria to be met by measures that fall into the ‘green’ 
box be revisited to ensure minimal trade distortion whilst at the same time recognising 
agriculture’s multifunctional role. It proposes that measures which meet important societal 
goals such as the protection of the environment, the sustained vitality of rural areas and 
poverty alleviation, food security for developing countries and animal welfare should be 
accommodated in the Agreement on Agriculture. It also wants specific disciplines to be 
applied to variable ‘amber’ box subsidies which boost export performance through providing 
compensation for variations in market prices. In this, it is clearly aiming at restricting the 
ability of the US to provide open-ended support through emergency aid packages in the 
future. 
China has historically taxed or ‘extracted surplus’ from the agricultural sector in an 
effort to support industrialisation, although this situation appears to be changing. Assuming 
that China has not had significant domestic support in the base period means that it would 
have a zero total AMS ceiling on such support. This would allow domestic support to be 
provided only if it complied with the criteria for inclusion in either the ‘green’ or ‘blue’ boxes 
or, if its support fell into the ‘amber’ box, up to the de minimis limits. This restriction may 
appear unimportant, given that China has committed itself to low import protection and price 
support. However, one anomaly is that the de minimis restrictions apply on a commodity basis 
whereas the total AMS ceiling restriction which all developed countries face applies on an 
aggregated basis across all commodities. This allows developed countries potentially to   27
provide much higher levels of support to sensitive commodities while still staying within their 
AMS ceiling than China will be able to do in the future. If China has not gained full 
entitlement to developing country status in claiming de minimis exemptions for domestic 
support in the current accession negotiations, it will be particularly sensitive to this issue and 
would appear likely to support the US position. Further, as China currently makes no use of 
‘blue box’ subsidies and is not likely to in the future, there does not appear to be any 
immediate reason why it should support the EU position on this issue. 
China has a huge rural population, and rural development is very important to it. 
However, it is unlikely to have the budget resources to engage in direct payment programmes 
to its farmers, who account for 50% of the population. It will, therefore, be receptive to the 
argument that targeted programmes to deal with environmental issues should be the preferred 
means as proposed by the US. It is unlikely to see merit in the argument that 
multifunctionality can justify price support measures to farmers. The EU has tried to make the 
multifunctionality argument more attractive to developing countries by suggesting that the 
concept could be extended to embrace their concerns with food security. However, this 
argument is unlikely to be acceptable to developing countries as a group who can point out 
that there are alternative means of achieving this end. While China might be persuaded to 
support the multifunctionality argument as a way of gaining concessions of more interest to it, 
the concept would appear to have little immediate appeal to the Chinese authorities. 
 
4.4  SPS issues 
The EU has identified food safety as another important objective in the current 
negotiations. Technological innovation, the globalisation of food supply, rising living 
standards and greater awareness of the risks of foodborne illnesses have led the public in 
many developed countries to become increasingly concerned about this issue. In the Uruguay   28
Round trade negotiations, a new Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Agreement and a 
strengthened Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement were agreed to provide a set of 
rules to govern behaviour in this area. Although these Agreements are not part of the WTO’s 
post-UR ‘built-in’ agenda, the EU and some other countries want to re-open aspects of these 
Agreements for further negotiation. 
The key principle underlying the SPS Agreement is that countries have the right to 
decide on the measures they deem necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. 
However, to prevent abuse, certain disciplines are applied. Measures should be based on 
scientific principles, should not be maintained without scientific justification, and should not 
be applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable way. While these principles work reasonably well in 
routine situations where the science is well-established, they are less clearcut with respect to 
novel risks where a scientific consensus has yet to emerge.  The EU argues that food 
regulations must take account of the precautionary principle, which would allow countries to 
restrict the marketing of food which has been produced using methods where scientific 
evidence is insufficient or there is scientific uncertainty. This principle is recognised in a 
limited way in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement which stipulates that, if relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient, members may adopt SPS measures, on a provisional basis, while 
seeking additional information about the risks posed by a hazard. However, this provision is 
more restrictive than what many consumer groups would like, e.g. the qualification by the 
word 'provisional'. The EU has therefore proposed that the application of the precautionary 
principle should be clarified. The US, on the other hand, does not favour opening the 1994 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to renegotiation. China is also likely to be 
cautious as it is an enthusiastic adopter of genetically-modified crops and may fear EU trade 
barriers against its fruit and vegetable exports if a stronger precautionary principle was 
adopted.   29
The EU has also raised the need to ensure that trade does not undermine efforts to 
improve the protection of the welfare of animals (WTO: G/AG/NG/W/19). When a country 
provides for animal welfare standards that go beyond those applied by other trading partners, 
it argues that consumers may not be provided with coherent information on the welfare 
standards to which imported products are produced, and that domestic producers may be 
economically disadvantaged. It has suggested a number of ways in which animal welfare 
concerns could be addressed, including multilateral agreements, labelling, and the payment of 
compensation for the additional costs of providing higher animal welfare where it can be 
clearly shown that these additional costs stem directly from the higher standards in question.  
Most opposition to raising animal welfare concernswithin the WTO comes from 
developing countries who fear that, in a worst-case scenario, animal welfare rules could be 
used to block imports from countries with lower standards and would be introduced with 
protectionist intent. The United States, on past experience, is also likely to view this issue 
with great suspicion. The EU has tried to allay developing country fears by pointing out that 
its  concerns with animal welfare a re most acute in relation to highly-intensive and 
industrialised production methods for poultry and pigs which is most often found in 
developed rather than developing and least developed countries.  
China will have a view on this issue given that, in 1998, pork output in China was 46 
per cent of the world total. Exports as a percentage of production are small and have been 
falling (from around 2 per cent of output in 1990 to less than 1 per cent in 1998). Due to 
quality and sanitary health standards China f inds it difficult to gain access to developed 
country markets, and most Chinese pork exports go to Russia and South-East Asian markets. 
There will be export opportunities in Japan, South Korea and, eventually, Taiwan as these 
countries open up their livestock markets to imports under WTO rules, though these countries 
will be tempted to continue to protect their producers by implementing sanitary measures and   30
technical barriers to trade. China may fear that greater flexibility by WTO Members to restrict 
imports on animal welfare grounds may limit its export opportunities for pigmeat in the 
future.  
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
China’s WTO agricultural offer is a strikingly liberal one which will create a strong 
basis for open trade. The tariff reductions for the principal products such as grains, meats, 
soybean oil and cotton are much larger than the reductions required by the Agreement on 
Agriculture. They are also a significant reduction on the schedules tabled by China at the end 
of the Uruguay Round, although significant out-of-quota tariff protection will still remain for 
food grains. The TRQs are well above the current levels of China’s imports (though perhaps 
not of imports earlier in the 1990s). Large shares of the TRQs will be allocated to the private 
sector to ensure the fulfilment of these TRQs. The implementation period of the commitments 
is five years, the developed country limit, and only half that allowed to developing countries.  
The extent of China’s offer should also be assessed in the light of the counterfactual 
level of protection. During the 1980s, agricultural protection was frequently negative for 
many major commodities, with implicit import subsidies used to maintain prices for urban 
consumers below world prices. During the 1990s, agricultural product prices have tended to 
be much more closely aligned with world prices and average protection rates appear to have 
been, on average, very close to zero. However, there has been significant year to year 
variation in protection rates, particularly for grains, and domestic prices of the major grains 
have frequently been higher than international prices in recent years. The WTO disciplines 
will prevent China from following the path to ever-increasing agricultural protection pursued 
by other East Asian economies who started earlier on an export-oriented growth strategy.    31
China’s likely position on the US and EU negotiating proposals as discussed in 
Section 4 is summarised in Table 5. On balance, China is likely to be more sympathetic to the 
EU negotiating position in the areas of market access, largely because of its desire to maintain 
its current grain import arrangements. These include tariff rate quotas, out-of-quota tariff 
peaks on grain imports, and the continued operation of COFCO as a state trader in grains. The 
EU is also likely to be more sympathetic to some form of safeguard clause for foodgrain 
imports. However, in the areas of export competition and domestic subsidies, China is more 
likely to favour the US position. However, this will be ‘soft’ support, arising from the fact that 
China itself would be unlikely to make use of any concessions in these areas rather than 
because it feels strongly opposed to them because of damage caused to its own agricultural 
sector. 
 
Table 5. Prospective Chinese attitude to US and EU negotiating proposals 
Policy area  US  EU 
Tariff reduction - extent and structure  -  ++ 
Protection against imported price 
instability 
   special safeguard clause 









Tariff rate quotas (TRQs)  -  + 
Use of STEs to administer TRQs  -   
Export subsidies  +  - 
Use of single-desk STE exporters  +/-  +/- 
Domestic support 
   extent of reduction 
   extension of ‘green box’ to cover 
multifunctional payments 












   precautionary principle 







++ implies that China would be a strong supporter of that country’s position, -- implies that it would strongly 
oppose, +/- implies that it would be indifferent. The absence of a sign implies that the country has not formally 
adopted a position on the issue. 
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Trade negotiations are about designing trade-offs. Understanding the strategic 
objectives of the other participants can lay the basis for compromises where one country 
agrees to support another in return for that country’s agreement to support it on its sensitive 
issues. China will enter the negotiations with a number of strategic objectives: limiting the 
extension of its tariff rate quotas in order to safeguard its grain self-sufficiency objective, 
protecting the role of its state trading enterprises, limiting the degree to which it imports 
world market price volatility into its own market, lowering both tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to its own agricultural exports, and seeking greater flexibility as a developing country with 
regard to domestic support. Both the US and the EU may find it worthwhile to tailor their 
negotiating objectives to meet these Chinese concerns with a view to attracting Chinese 
support for their broader objectives. In this way, China could have a considerable influence on 
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